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When people revise subjective probabilities in light of data, revisions a r e  
less than the amount prescribed by the normative model, Bayes's theorem. 
Previous research suggests that this results from the subjects' lack of under- 
standing of the implications of the data; i.e., from inaccurate subjective 
sampling distributions. This experiment examined the effects on conserva- 
tire revisions of training subjects about, the implications of data. 
The subjects estimated sampling distributions for two binomial popula- 
tions, were shown samples from the populations in order to teach them 
veridical distributions, and again estimated sampling distributions. Estimated 
sampling distributions were good predictors of revisions and, as a result 
of training, both the sampling distributions and the revisions became more 
veridical. 
A number  of recent experiments have shown tha t  when people revise 
their  subjective probabili t ies about  hypotheses in light of data,  the re- 
visions tend to be less than  the amount  prescribed by  the appropriate  
normat ive  model (e.g., Phillips and Edwards,  1966; Phillips, Hays ,  and 
Edwards,  1966; Peterson and Miller, 1965; Schum, Goldstein, and 
Southard, 1966). This phenomenon is called conservatism (Edwards, 
Lindman,  and Phillips, 1965) and two explanations have been advanced 
to account for it. The first is tha t  subjects have difficulty in performing 
the mechanics of integrating the meaning of the da ta  into their subjective 
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probabilities (Phillips, 1966). However, the orderliness of conservative 
revisions, together with evidence that subjects can perform complex and 
subtle subjective manipulations of their subjective probabilities (Beach, 
1966; Beach and Peterson, 1966; Peterson, Ulehla, Miller, Bourne, and 
Stilson, 1965), suggests that the  cause m a y  lie somewhat deeper than 
arithmetic errors. The second explanation is that subjects may not always 
understand the impIications of the data for the hypotheses under con, 
sideration. This is especially plausible in the extremely abstract experi. 
mental tasks in which conservatism has been found. ~ : : 
• The usual •paradigm is to te l l  the subjects that •there are two ~riis 
(the •hypotheses) full of poker chips. One urn containsi say, .'~0 red chips 
and .30 blue chips and the other contains .30 red chips and .70 blue. Out .of 
the subjeetg sight, the  experimenter flips a coin £o::select: an Urn, draws 
a random Sample of chips with replacement, and displays the sample. The 
subjects' t a s k  is to estimate the :probability of each urn having, been the 
source of the observed sample. To perform this task, the subjects' initial 
subieetiv~ probabilities of .50-.50 must be revised in light of the data 
and lthe:revised subjective probabilities stated as estimates. This is the 
procedure a statistician would follow using Bayes's theorem, the ap~ 
propriate normative model (Edwards et al., 1965), and the research to 
date shows that this is generally the same procedure that subjects follow. 
However, suppose that the sample contained eight red chips and four 
blue ones. Using Bayes's theorem, the statistician would state a revised 
probability of .97 for the .70 red urn and of .03 for the .70 blue urn, while 
subjects typically estimate about .75 and .25, respectively; subjects do 
not revise as  much as the statistician does for the same data. Or, stated 
differently,: subjects apparently fail to regard the data as being as 
diagnostic as  the statistician does. 
For a statistician the diagnosticity of a sample is given by the sampling 
distributions for the hypotheses under consideration, in this case for 
.70-.30 binomial populations. So, to say that subjects regard data as less 
diagnostic :than the statistician does is to say, formally, that their 
sampling distributions are more like rectangular distributions than 
theoretical distributions are. 
When looked at in this way it is clear that investigation of the second 
explanation of conservatism, that subjects do not understand the implica- 
tions of the data, involves the investigation of subjective sampling dis- 
tributions. The subject's estimates of sampling distributions should be too 
flat. Moreover, the errors in the estimated sampling distribtuions should 
correspond to the errors in the revisions that presumably rely on the inac- 
curate distributions. And finally, if, through training, subiecti~/e sampling 
distributions could be made more accurate, and if revisions became cor- 
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-respondingly more optimal, it would provide supporting evidence for the 
hypothesis. 
This investigation was performed by Peterson, DuCharme, and 
:Edwards (1967) using the ura and poker chip paradigm described above. 
Subjects revised their subjective probabilities for a number of samples 
tha t  were each preceded by the random selection of an urn and a random 
draw with replacement. After this they estimated the sampling distribu- 
-tions for the urns. Then, to teach the subjects what the theoretical dis- 
tributions are like, successive samples were drawn from: an urn and 
displayed by being tallied in a frequency distribution. As the  samples 
were drawn t h e  subjects revised their: own estimates of the sampling 
~distribution until, at the end of training, their estimates looked like the 
theoretical distribution. Then they made a second set of subjective prob- 
"ability revisions for the samples drawn from the randomly selected urns, 
• I t  was found that the initial revised probabilities were conservative 
and that estimated distributions were initially too flat. By using the 
values from these estimated sampling distributions in Bayes's theorem 
instead of values from the theoretical distributions, it was possible to 
predict the subjects' conservative revised probabilities. This appears to 
be strong evidence ~that subjective revision procedures and Bayesian 
procedures are the same and that the subjects' flat sampling distributions 
are responsible for conservatism. However, the second, post-training, set 
of revised subjective probabilities was only slightly less conservative 
than the first. The process of teaching the subjects about sampling dis- 
tributi0ns apparently had very little effect. 
The conservatism of the second set of revisions mitigates the evidence 
provided by the consistency between the first set and subjects! flat  esti- 
mated sampling distributions. I t  is possible that in this experimental set- 
ting subjects tend to hedge their bet by flattening all of their response 
distributions, be they revisions, estimated sampling distributions, or :what- 
ever. If so, the flat distributions could be consistent with the conservative 
revisions even though the sampling distribution hypothesis is ~wrong. 
Until a strong link between conservatism and subjective sampling distri- 
butions can be shown, preferably by commensurate changes in both as a 
function of training, the consistency results must remain, at best, circum- 
stantial and inconclusive evidence for the hypothesis. The purpose of this 
experiment was to investigate the effects of training and by doing so to 
demonstrate the link between revision of subjective probabilities and 
Subjective sampling distributions. 
There are two salient possibilities that might have caused the second 
set of revisions to be conservative. The first is that the training procedure 
had no effect and the second is that it was effective but that the subjects 
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were attempting to decrease the risk of gross error by making conservaz 
tire responses in the second revision task. In the experiment to be re- 
ported, the training method was changed and payoffs were added to the 
revision task to discourage distortion of responses. 
The training method was similar to the one used by Peterson et al. 
(1967) except that it perhaps was more compatible wi~h subjects' normal 
methods of learning about the implications of data for hypotheses, The 
usual course of subjective inference is from observations of data to 
statements about hypotheses, i.e., the focus is on the probabilities of 
various hypotheses given the observed data. Sampling distributions in- 
volve lust the opposite kind of probability statements, the probability 
of obtaining the observed data assuming a particular hypothesis to be 
true. While subjective sampling distributions are basic to revisions and 
inferences, they are seldom the central focus of subjects' thinking about 
the task; they are formed by incidental learning in the course of observ- 
ing data in relation to hypotheses. Therefore, instead of concentrating 
their attention on sampling distributions in order to increase verdicality, 
the subjects saw samples, m a d e b e t s  about which population was the 
source of the samples, and then were told which population was correct. 
The distribution of displayed samples conformed to the theoretical 
sampling distributions for the two urns, betting focused on the prob- 
abilities of each of the two urns given each sample, and feedback pro- 
vided the necessary information for learning about the relation between 
the samples and the urns, i.e., about sampling distributions. The sub- 
]ects estimated the sampling distributions at the beginning and end of 
training and these estimates were compared with the subiective proba- 
bility revisions inferred from the bets made early and late in training 
to see if they were consistent both times and if inaccuracy and conser- 
vatism had decreased with training. 
METHOD 
APPARATUS 
The two urns were represented by two cards with ten poker chips on 
them. One urn contained .80 red chips and .20 blue; the other urn con- 
rained .40 red chips and .60 blue. In addition, nine other cards, each with 
eight poker chips on them, were used to display the nine possible samples 
for a sample size of eight. One card had eight red chips and zero blue 
chips, one had seven red chips and one blue, etc. 
Subjective binomial distributions were obtained by having the subjects 
distribute 100 markers among a set of nine troughs; each marker rep- 
resented .01 and each trough represented one of the possible samples. 
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The markers were distributed roughly equally to begin with and the 
subjects modified the arrangement to represent their estimates. Estimates 
of a fraction of .01 were permitted, but very few were made. 
Bets were made by selecting the pair of payoffs for which the subject 
was willing to bet in light of his subjective probabilities for the urns 
given the particular sample that had been drawn. A list of 51 pairs of 
payoffs was printed on the pages of an answer book and, for each sample, 
the subjects indicated which urn they thought was most likely and then 
marked the pair of payoffs for which they were willing to bet. 
Payoffs were in the form of points and the list conformed to Toda's 
(1963) quadratic payoff function. If a subject attempted to maximize 
his subjectively expected winnings in points, only one bet on the list was 
optimal in view of his subjective probabilities given the observed sample. 
By assuming that subjects do attempt to maximize their earnings it is 
possible to reason backwards from their choice of payoffs and to infer 
the subjective probabilities that underlie the choice. This assumption is 
sound because the subjects were told at the start that their pay for 
participating in the experiment was entirely dependent upon the number 
of points accumulated in the course of training. (For a more detailed 
explanation of the betting and payoff procedure see Beach and Phillips, 
19'67.) 
PROCEDURE 
First, the subjects were told about the urns and the sampling procedure. 
Then they estimated the probabilities of obtaining each of the nine kinds 
of samples on a random draw from the P ~ .80 red urn and from the 
P ~ .60 blue urn, i.e., they estimated the sampling distributions. 
Then the betting procedure was explained and the subjects were told 
~hat to help them better understand the relation of the samples and the 
urns, they would be shown a series of random samples of chips and that 
the sampled urn had been selected by flipping a fair coin before each 
sample was drawn. After seeing a sample they were to bet on which urn 
it was drawn from by indicating the urn they favored and selecting a 
pair of payoffs from the list. If the urn that they bet on actually was the 
source of the sample they would receive the high payoff in the pair, other- 
wise they would receive the low payoff. After they made their bets the 
experimenter told them which urn was correct and each subject added 
the appropriate number of points to his running total on an adding 
machine that sat on the desk in front of him. The procedural sequence 
was this: The subjects estimated sampling distributions, then saw and 
made bets on 100 samples, the first 20 of which were used for the revision- 
~ask data analyses. Then they reestimated the sampling distributions 
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(primarily to relieve boredom), saw 100 more samples, and made their 
final set of sampling distribution estimates. Then they saw a final 20 
samples that were identical to the first 20 samples and that also were 
used for revision-task analyses. 
Subjects. Seventeen male university students served as volunteer sub- 
jects in groups of 3, 4, and 5 at a time. 
RESULTS 
In Fig. 1 the subiects' estimated sampling distributions are compared 
with the theoretical distributions. The estimated distributions were ob. 
rained by computing each subject's likelihood ratio for each sample; the 
quotient of his estimate of the probability of the predominantly red urn 
given the sample and his estimate of the probability of the predominantly 
blue urn given the sample. Then median likelihood ratios were obtained 
across subjects for each sample. The probabilities plotted in Fig. 1 are 
the two estimated probabilities that comprised each of these median 
ratios (normalization was required to make the distributions total 1.00 
but the change in the points was slight). 
The subjects' first estimates of the sampling distributions were too 
flat compared with the theoretical distributions. In general, the training 
procedure brought them into closer correspondence with the theoretical 
values, although complete accuracy was never attained. Indeed, for some 
samples the subjects' distributions became more extreme than the theo- 
retical distributions. The distributions estimated in the middle of training 
fall between the curves in Fig. 1 but, for the sake of clarity, they are 
not presented. 
The degree of correspondence between the estimated distributions and 
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Fro. 1. Estimated sampling distributions before and after training. 
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of the median likelihood ratios underlying the subjective curves in Fig. 
1 against the logs of likelihood ratios obtained from the theoretical 
curves. 2 This comparison, Fig. 2a, clearly shows the conservative nature 
of the first estimates. Training brought the subjective likelihood ratios, 
i.e., subjective sampling distributions, into line with the theoretical values 
although there was a bias toward favoring the predominantly red urn. 
This bias was found throughout the data and will be discussed later. 
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Fza. 2 Log likelihood ratios inferred (a) from estimated sampling distributions 
and (b) from revision responses (bets) compared with theoretical values before and 
after training. 
The curves in Fig. 2a are quite representative of the curves for in- 
dividual subjects. This is illustrated best by the correlations and regres- 
sion slopes, for each subject, between the theoretical log likelihood ratios 
and the log likelihood ratios constructed from his estimated distributions. 
For the median values in Fig. 2a, the correlations were .95 before train- 
ing and .93 afterwards. More important, however, are the slopes of the 
regression lines for predicting the subjective ratios from the theoretical 
ratios. These were .44 before training, indicating flat subjective sampling 
distributions, and .85 after training, indicating more verdical distributions. 
The analysis for individual subjects yielded median correlations of .92 
(with 53%, i.e., 9, of the 17 subjects' correlations lying between .90 and 
.95) before training and .91 (53% between .87 and .95) after training. 
The median slope was .45 (53% between .37 and .55) before training, 
Minor irregularities in the very small probabilities for samples of 0 red-8 blue, 
1 red-? blue, and 8 red-0 blue lead to extremely deviant likelihood ratios. In addi- 
tion, these samples seldom occurred during training and yielded very little and very 
unstable data. Because both factors lead to unrepresentative results, data for these 
points were deleted from all analyses. 
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indicating flat distributions and .96 (53% between .60 and 1.11) after 
training, indicating increased veridieality. 
Thus far both the group results in Fig. 2a and the individual subjects' 
results conform to those reported by Peterson et al. (1967). The next 
question is whether the training used in this experiment successfully 
influenced subjective probability revisions. A comparison similar to that  
in Fig. 2a is afforded by data from the 20 identical bets at the beginning 
and end of training. The ratio form of Bayes's theorem is 
P(U, Is) P(s]Ur) P(Ur) 
P(Cbls-----~ = P(s[ Ub-----)" P(Ub)' 
where Ur and Ub are the predominantly red and predominantly blue urns 
respectively and s is the observed sample of chips. In this experiment the 
probabilities prior to the presentation of each sample were always 
P(Ur) -=- P(Ub) = .50 and their ratio was 1.00. The posterior probabili- 
ties, P(Ur[s) and P(Ub]s), were inferred from the subjects' bets and, 
because the ratio of the prior probabilities is 1.00, the ratios of the 
posterior probabilities could be assumed equal to the likelihood ratios, 
P(s[ U~)/P(sl Ub). 
This permitted the subjects' likelihood ratios for each of the 20 trials 
at the beginning and end of training to be constructed from the subjec- 
tive probabilities inferred from their choices of bets. 
Figure 2b shows the relation between the median log likelihood ratios 
inferred from both the first and the last bets and the corresponding 
theoretical log likelihood ratios2 The correlations between these variables 
for the data in the figure were .86 before training and .93 after training. 
The respective slopes were .72, indicating conservatism at the beginning 
,of training, and 1.05, indicating accurate revisions at the end of training. 
Analyses for the individual subjects yielded median correlations at the 
beginning and end of training of .86 and .89 (53 9 between .76 and .90 
and between .86 and .92, respectively). The median slopes were .70 (53~ 
between .45 and .97), indicating conservatism at the beginning, and 1.13 
(53% between .84 and 1.45), indicating more nearly accurate revisions 
at  the end of training. 
Comparison of Figs. 2a and 2b and the results for individual subjects, 
shows that  both the distribution estimates and the bets (revisioris) 
yielded likelihood ratios that  were less conservative after training. The 
s The two boxed points on Figs. 2b and 3 indicate median inferred probabilities 
o f  1.00 from the bets. There is no ratio for 1.00 and .00 and so i t  was assumed that  
t he  subjects were trying to indicate a probability slightly higher than the next 
lowest probability, and consequently that value, .995, was used. 
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final question is whether the two sets of ratios, those inferred from 
the estimates and those inferred from the bets, both reflect a common set 
of subjective sampling :distributions. The comparison is shown in Fig. 
3. Except for the deviations at the extreme ratios, which will be discussed 
directly, the two kinds of ratios are  quite similar. For the group data in 
Fig. 3, the correlations between the log likelihood ratios from the esti-- 
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FIG. 3. Consistency of inferred 10g likelihood ratios from. estimated distributlon~ 
and from revision responses (bets) before and after training. 
mated distributions and from bets before and after training are .90 and 
.99 with slopes of 1.57 and 1.22. The analysis of the individual subjects' 
.data:gave ~ median correlation of .85 (53% between •.72 and .93) before 
~raining and .94 (53% between .90 and .97) after training. The median 
slope was 1.27 (53% between .76 and 1.93) before training and 1.29 ~ 
~(53% between .90 and 1.57) after training. 
T h e  high slopes Show that the log likelihood ratios inferred from bets 
(revisions) were slightly more extreme than those inferred from the 
estimated distributions. This is not surprising because, as :Beach and 
Phillips (1967) found, this betting method yields values more extreme 
than estimated values for very high and very low estimated probabilities._ 
I t  is these extreme probabilities that constitute the large and small 
likelihood ratios and produce the distortions illustrated in Fig. 3 and 
found in the individual subjects' data. 
The systematic distortion of the slopes in this comparison must not. be  
allowed to cloud the more fundamental finding that the relation between 
the two sets of ratios changes very little from the beginning to the end' 
of training. What change there was consisted primarily of decreased re- 
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:sponse variance, as evidenced by increased correlations, and a correspond- 
ing decrease in the variance of the distribution of slope values. These 
changes are probably attributable to the subjects' increased familarity 
with the tasks as training progressed. Beach and Phillips (1967) showed 
that  the stability of subjects' probability estimates and bets, and there- 
fore correlations involving them, increased in the course of training. 
One aspect of the  results, mentioned above, demands further comment. 
Thoughout both the group results in the figures and the individual sub- 
]ects' results, there was a fairly consistent bias in favor of the pre- 
dominantly red urn. This may have resulted from the asymmetry of the 
two urn compositions and the consequent asymmetry of the sampling 
distributions. In the usual subjective probability-revision experiment the 
two urns are symmetric, so that, for instance, a sample of 2 red-6 blue 
chips would favor the predominantly blue urn by exactly the same 
amount that a 6 red-2 blue sample would favor the predominantly red 
urn. In this asymmetric case, of the nine possible samples, five favor 
the blue urn and four favor the red urn, with one of the four just Slightly 
favoring the red urn (Fig. 1). The subjects appear to have been influenced 
b y  this, imposed symmetry on the samples, and thereby were biased 
toward the red urn. The interesting thing however, is that this bias 
appeared in both the estimates and in the bets (revisions) further suppQrt 
for the hypothesis that both reflect the subjects' underlying subjective 
:sampling distributions. 
In summary, the results demonstrate the link between conservatism 
and the inaccuracy of subjective sampling distributions. At the beginning 
~f the experiment subiects' estimated sampling distributions were too 
flat, their revisions were conservative, and the two errors were consistent 
with one another. At the end of training the estimated distributions were 
more veridical, the revisions were less conservative, and the two sets of 
responses were still consistent with one another. The effects of training 
and the consistency between estimates and revisions at the end of training 
go beyond the Peterson et  al. (1967) results and provide additional 
.evidence that conservatism is due at least in part to subjects' failure to 
understand the implications of the data for the hypotheses under 
,consideration. 
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